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Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides ultimate cryptographic security based on the laws of
quantum mechanics. For point–to–point QKD protocols, the security of the generated key is com-
promised by detector side channel attacks. This problem can be solved with measurement device
independent QKD (mdi–QKD). However, mdi–QKD has shown limited performances in terms of
the secret key generation rate, due to post–selection in the Bell measurements. We show that high
dimensional (Hi–D) encoding (qudits) improves the performance of current mdi–QKD implemen-
tations. The scheme is proven to be unconditionally secure even for weak coherent pulses with
decoy states, while the secret key rate is derived in the single photon case. Our analysis includes
phase errors, imperfect sources and dark counts to mimic real systems. Compared to the standard
bidimensional case, we show an improvement in the key generation rate.
Introduction
Digital security is important for several aspects of mod-
ern life. Classical cryptography only promises to make
decryption hard, but not impossible. On the contrary,
quantum key distribution (QKD) is based on the laws
of physics, theoretically allowing parties to share crypto-
graphic keys in an unconditionally secure way [1]. How-
ever, several physical requirements have to be satisfied to
provide unconditional security, and most experimental
implementations of QKD have proven to be vulnerable
to attacks [2–11]. These attacks mainly exploit weak-
nesses in the detectors, whereas the sources are less vul-
nerable. To overcome this limitation, device independent
(di–QKD) [1, 12–14], and measurement device indepen-
dent QKD (mdi–QKD) [15] were introduced to decrease
the reliance on the physical setup. While di–QKD re-
mains challenging due to technical limitations, including
the need for extremely efficient detection [1], mdi–QKD
is ready to be implemented in real networks.
Mdi–QKD was introduced by Lo et al. in Ref. [15].
Here, the two parties Alice and Bob only use photon
sources, while the detection is performed by a third party,
Charlie. Different degrees of freedom have been used to
demonstrate the feasibility of this scheme (e.g.: polar-
ization, phase, time, and space) [15–17]. Compared to
other QKD protocols, however, mdi-QKD has shown low
key generation rates. To reduce this limitation, high-
dimensional (Hi–D) encoding can be used to improve the
photon information efficiency (PIE) [18]. Recent results
have shown how spatial or temporal modes can be used
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to increase the dimension of the Hilbert space [19–23] for
standard QKD. We propose a protocol, where Alice and
Bob generate qudits (quantum states in N–dimensions)
encoded in different paths or time slots of the photons.
These photons then interfere at Charlie’s Beam Splitters
(BS), as shown in Fig. 1. As discussed below, the mea-
surement projects the qubits into a two dimensional sub-
space, which can be used for QKD. In the following, we
analyse this high dimensional mdi–QKD protocol, con-
sidering the main sources of errors, such as, imperfect
photon generation, dark counts and (unknown) phase
shifts. We prove that high dimensional mdi–QKD is un-
conditionally secure for coherent states with the decoy
state technique [15, 24], and analyse the key generation
rate for single photon sources. In analogy to a similar re-
sult for standard QKD [23], we find that our Hi–D mdi–
QKD protocol is advantageous, particularly in the detec-
tor saturation regime, where the time between photon
clicks at Charlie’s detectors is comparable to the detec-
tors’ dead time τd. We study the protocol both for time
and space encoding, and analyse the practical constraints
that make one encoding better than the other. A differ-
ent Hi–D mdi–QKD scheme was proposed in Ref. [18],
but remains experimentally unfeasible, since discriminat-
ing Bell states in high dimensions is impossible by simple
means [25, 26]. In comparison, our protocol can be im-
plemented without significant increase in the complexity
of existing setups. In particular, for weak coherent states
and time encoding, no change in the hardware is required.
Protocol definition
Most QKD protocols are based on mutually unbi-
ased bases (MUBs). Usually, the computational Z ba-
sis ({|0〉, |1〉} for qubits) is less susceptible to errors than
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the proposed setup for Hi-D-mdi QKD.
(a) Space is used to encode information in different paths
(multi-core fibers can be used as transmission channels). 2N
single photon detectors are necessary for this configuration.
(b) Time encoding scheme, where different time-slots are used
to encode the qudits. The number of detectors is independent
of the dimension N .
the X basis ({|φ0〉, |φ1〉}, with |φ0〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/
√
2 and
|φ1〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2). This is also the case for the
encodings in Fig. 1, where different wave packets may
dephase, but are unlikely to switch from one bin to an-
other. Thus, the Z basis is used for key generation, and
the X basis for error estimation. Generalizations of the Z
and X bases are, respectively, {|0〉, |1〉, ..., |N − 1〉}, and
{|φ0〉, ..., |φN−1〉}. Here, |φi〉 are the N orthonormal su-
perpositions of all the elements of the Z basis, with equal
and real weights. As an example, for N = 4:
|φ0〉 =1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉+ |2〉+ |3〉) , (1a)
|φ1〉 =1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉 − |2〉+ |3〉) , (1b)
|φ2〉 =1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉 − |2〉 − |3〉) , (1c)
|φ3〉 =1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉+ |2〉 − |3〉) . (1d)
Our N dimensional mdi–QKD protocol for two MUBs
is given by the procedure:
1. Alice and Bob choose, with probability Pb ∈ (0, 1),
the Z basis and with probability 1−Pb the X basis.
2. Alice and Bob randomly generate one of the N qu-
dits in the chosen basis, and send it to Charlie.
3. Whenever Charlie gets a coincidence click of two
detectors, he publicly announces the outcome of his
measurement. Otherwise, the event is discarded.
4. Steps (1) to (4) are repeated, to have enough
statistics to estimate the quantum bit error rate
(QBER), and sufficiently many bits of key.
5. Alice and Bob announce their bases, and estimate
the QBER. If the QBER is too high, they abort the
protocol.
6. Alice and Bob proceed with classical error correc-
tion and privacy amplification.
For simplicity (when not otherwise specified), we de-
scribe the protocol in the space encoding of Fig. 1(a),
with straightforward generalization to the time encod-
ing. Assume first that Alice and Bob both choose the Z
basis. Whenever they send the same element |i〉, two pho-
tons arrive at the same BS and bunch together. There is
thus no coincidence event, and the outcome is discarded.
When Alice and Bob generate different states |i〉 and |j〉
(i 6= j), these photons necessarily end up in different de-
tectors, and Charlie gets a coincidence click. The mea-
surement collapses the state onto the two–dimensional
space {|i〉A⊗ |j〉B ; |j〉A⊗ |i〉B}, with the first state being
Alice’s, the latter Bob’s. An eavesdropper Eve cannot
distinguish whether Alice sent the state |i〉 and Bob |j〉
or vice versa, and thus can only guess with 50% probabil-
ity the bit of key. In the X basis interference only allows
half of all possible coincidence clicks to happen, and this
permits determining the QBER relative to all two dimen-
sional subspaces. For example, consider the case N = 2,
and assume that both Alice and Bob send states with the
same phase. Then, only coincidences on the same side of
the BSs of Fig. 1(a) are allowed. If Alice and Bob choose
different phases, opposite outcomes are permitted. This
concept is generalizable to N > 2, considering that the
detection collapses the state onto a two dimensional sub-
space, so that only the relative phases within this sub-
space matter. Alice and Bob can thus determine the con-
tributions i,jx to the QBER x, where i, j = 0, ..., N − 1
are all possible indices of the 2–dimensional subspaces of
the composite Hilbert space. For finite key length and
high dimensions, there may be insufficient statistics to
estimate each individual error rate i,jx . In this case, the
QBER can be determined by merging all X measure-
ments into a single error rate x. The QBER for the
N dimensional protocol can thus be estimated with the
same resources as for the standard 2 dimensional proto-
col [27]. If the error rates i,jx are different (e.g. due to
different detectors), a better key rate can be obtained by
treating the errors independently. For simplicity, we re-
strict ourselves to the simplest strategy and only consider
a single error rate x.
Secret key rate
We first prove that our Hi–D protocol is uncondition-
ally secure, both for single photon sources and for co-
herent states with the decoy state method [24]. Then,
we investigate all elements of the setup – sources, chan-
nels and detectors – to determine the QBER and raw
key generation rate per application of the protocol (Rp)
in the single photon case and for realistic experimental
conditions. Finally, we consider the detector saturation
regime.
In order to prove that Hi–D mdi–QKD is uncondi-
tionally secure, we show that the security of the N di-
3mensional protocol follows from the two dimensional case
[15, 28–30]. The key argument is that, whenever Charlie
announces a coincidence click, the wave function is pro-
jected onto a two dimensional subspace, with all other
states being erased by the measurement. As an example,
consider Fig. 1(a), and assume that one of detectors 1 and
2 and one of detectors 7 and 8 click. The system is thus
projected onto the Bell states (|0〉A|3〉B ± |3〉A|0〉B)/
√
2,
with the sign determined by the parity of the measure-
ment (clicks in 1 & 7 or 2 & 8 lead to a plus, 1 & 8 or 2
& 7 to a minus). It follows that, if Alice and Bob both
chose the X basis, all states other than |0〉 and |3〉 are
erased by the measurement. On the other hand, if the
Z basis was used, the parties had to have chosen these
particular states as qudits. Every successful realization
of the Hi–D protocol, is thus equivalent to an application
of the two dimensional protocol, with the specific states
identified by Charlie’s measurement.
To complete the security proof, we follow Ref. [15] and
consider the virtual qudit approach [31]. We imagine that
both parties prepare an entangled state of two qudits, of
which one is sent to Charlie, and the other (the virtual
one) is kept. The travelling photons are then encoded in
the basis states by measuring the virtual qudits. Since
these measurements can be postponed till after Charlie’s
outcome is revealed, and since this outcome projects the
state onto a two dimensional subsystem, the protocol is
equivalent to the entanglement based protocol for qubits
[32, 33].
The secret key rate r can be derived from Ref. [15, 31,
34, 35]:
r = R [1−H (x)− f (z)H (z)] , (2)
where R is the raw key rate, f(x) ≥ 1 is an inefficiency
function for the error correction, and H(x) the binary
entropy. The same security proof can be adapted to the
case of weak coherent pulses with the decoy state tech-
nique [15]. Since the measurement collapses the system
to a two dimensional subspace, high–dimensional entan-
glement cannot be fully exploited with the current set-
tings. It is thus not surprising that the Hi–D protocol can
be described in terms of standard mdi–QKD protocols.
However, as we will see in the following, our protocol still
allows for improvements.
With the protocol proven unconditionally secure, we
now estimate the key rate taking into account realistic
sources, channels and detectors. Above and in the fol-
lowing we assumed identical channels and detectors [36].
(Sources) In Hi–D mdi–QKD both Alice and Bob are
required to generate qudits. These Hi–D photons have
to interfere to generate the key, and therefore need to
be identical. We quantify the errors introduced by dis-
tinguishable photons, assuming different shapes of the
emitted photons. This can be described by expanding Al-
ice’s state |iA〉A (i = 0, ..., N − 1) in terms of Bob’s wave
function according to |iA〉A → β|iB〉A +
√
1− |β|2|I〉A,
where |I〉A shares the encoding of Bob’s state (meaning
that is in the same path/time slot), but is in one or more
modes other than |iB〉A. If both parties use the Z ba-
sis, there should never be coincidences between detectors
associated with the same BS in Fig. 1(a), and if the pho-
tons are in different paths it does not matter if they are
distinguishable. Hence, the influence of distinguishable
photons can be identified and never leads to errors in the
key rate. However, for the X basis, there is a probability
|β|2 that the photons interfere correctly, and a proba-
bility 1 − |β|2 that they click at random detectors, thus
incrementing the QBER x by (1− |β|2)/2.
(Channels) The most general errors affecting qudits in
transmission lines are bit–flips and phase–shifts [37]. We
neglect the first ones, since the probability that a photon
disappears and reappears in another spatially or tempo-
rally separated slot is small [20, 21]. Instead, within the
transmission channel any state |i〉J acquires a random
phase, such that |i〉J → eiθJi |i〉J . Here, i = 0, ..., N − 1
and J = A,B indicates whether the qudit was gener-
ated by Alice or Bob. Like before, the Z basis is unaf-
fected by phase noise, since bits of key are only exchanged
when photons do not interfere. However, for any pair
of elements in the X basis, interference prevents half of
the allowed coincidence clicks. Whenever phase noise af-
fects the qudits, wrong clicks happen with a probability[
1− 〈cos (θAi − θAj − θBi + θBj )〉] /2, with i 6= j (the case
i = j is automatically discarded). To quantify this ef-
fect, a noise model for the random variables θAi − θAj and
θBj − θBi is required. Different models are better suited
for different transmission lines and encoding schemes. In
the space one, we consider a homogeneous situation, such
that relative phases θAi −θAj and θBj −θBi are Gaussian dis-
tributed, with zero average and identical variance σ2. In
the time domain, phase drifts in the sources can be added
as independent noise contributions in this model. Here,
we assume white noise between subsequent pulses, such
that the variances of θAi − θAj and θBj − θBi are |i− j|σ2.
Alternatively, if the interferometer is slowly drifting, an
appropriate model would be |i− j|2σ2.
(Detection) For long distances, dark counts prevail
over real clicks, increasing the QBER. We define Pdc the
probability that a single detector clicks without a pho-
ton, and Ps = η10
−α0d/10 the probability that a photon
arrives at a detector and clicks. Here, η is the detector’s
efficiency, α0 the fiber loss coefficient and d the distance
separating both Alice and Bob from Charlie. In the Z
basis, Alice and Bob verify if Charlie’s announcement is
compatible with the qudit they sent. A wrong bit of key
is shared if and only if Alice and Bob send the same state,
and a bit–flip (induced by dark counts) occurs. If none
or one photon arrives, a random bit of key is shared with
probabilities 4N−1N (1−Ps)2P 2dc(1−Pdc)2N−2 (0 photons
arrive) and 4N−1N Ps(1− Ps)Pdc(1− Pdc)2N−2 (1 photon
arrives). In case both photons click at the detectors, the
probability to share a correct bit is N−1N P
2
s (1−Pdc)2N−2.
A wrong bit is produced by two photons bunching to-
gether and a different detector firing, which happens with
4FIG. 2. Secure key rate as a function of distance. Plain lines
refer to N = 2, dash–dotted lines to N = 3, dashed lines
to N = 4 and dotted lines to N = 8. (a,b): No detector
dead time, τd = 0. The secret key rate without detector dead
time r˜, is found using Eq. (2), with R substituted by Rp, i.e.:
r˜ is in bit per application of the protocol. (c): Secret key
rate per second r as a function of distance. The dead time
is τd = 20 ns, and the minimum pulse separation T˜p = 200
ps (τd/T˜p = 100). Common parameters are: Pdc = 1 · 10−6,
f(z) = 1, |β|2 = 0.85, η = 0.145 and σ equal to 0.175 (time)
or 0.325 (space). σ is chosen such that, for N = 2 when only
including dephasing, there is a QBER x of 1.5% (time) or
5% (space).
a probability 2N−1N P
2
s Pdc(1−Pdc)2N−2. From these, it is
possible to find how many wrong bits of key are shared
on average, and thus the QBER z and the raw rate per
application of the protocol Rp in the Z basis.
We now explicitly calculate the QBER x in the X
basis, including phase noise and distinguishability. If
no photons arrive at Charlie, half the coincidence clicks
are correct, half wrong, both occurring with probabil-
ity (1 − Ps)2N(N − 1)P 2dc(1 − Pdc)2N−2. With a sin-
gle photon clicking, the probability to have a correct or
wrong coincidence click is 2Ps(1 − Ps)(N − 1)Pdc(1 −
Pdc)
2N−2. When both photons click at Charlie’s detec-
tors, the probabilities for the outcome to be correct or
wrong are P 2s (1− Pdc)2N−2
[
P
(X)
good + (N − 1)PdcP (X)double
]
and P 2s (1 − Pdc)2N−2
[
P
(X)
bad + (N − 1)PdcP (X)double
]
, re-
spectively. Here, P
(X)
double = (1 + |β|2)/N is the prob-
ability that both photons end up in the same detec-
tor. P
(X)
bad =
[
N(N − 1)− 2|β|2fN
]
/(2N2) and P
(X)
good =[
N(N − 1) + 2|β|2fN
]
/(2N2) are the probabilities to
have or not have the photonic interference spoiled by
phase noise and distinguishability. The function fN de-
pends on the considered phase noise model. For the space
encoding, we find fN = N(N − 1)e−σ2/2. For the time,
fN =
[
N
(
1− e−σ2
)
+ e−Nσ
2 − 1
]
/
[
2 sinh
(
σ2/2
)]2
.
With these results, it is possible to find how many bits
of key are wrong on average, and thus the QBER x in
the X basis.
By merging the results above for sources, channel and
detection imperfection, we derive Fig. 2(a,b), where the
secret key rate per application of the protocol is deter-
mined using Eq. (2), with R substituted by the raw key
rate per application of the protocol Rp. From the plot
we find the advantage of Hi–D mdi–QKD, as compared
to standard mdi–QKD. The probability that Alice and
Bob send the same state |i〉 (resulting in a useless event)
asymptotically goes to zero. This implies that, for small
Pdc, the performance is improved by a factor 2(N−1)/N
compared to the standard mdi–QKD protocol, where half
of the events are lost even if Alice and Bob select the same
basis.
In the following, we study the regime where the detec-
tor’s dead time τd is comparable to the timescale at which
photons click at Charlie’s detectors, and dark counts are
negligible. We assume that during τd Alice and Bob send
n pulses separated by Tp = τd/n. In this regime, ordi-
nary QKD has proven to gain advantage from high di-
mensional encoding [23, 38]. In the following, we extend
this result to mdi–QKD, considering space and time en-
codings separately.
(Space) For any dimension N of the Hilbert space,
2N detectors are used (see Fig. 1). The probability
per pulse Phit that a detector is hit by a photon is
Phit =
1
2N
[
2Ps(1− Ps) + P 2s (2N − 1)/N
]
. In the con-
tinuous limit (t Tp), the cumulative distribution for a
detector being hit within a time t is 1− e−Phitt/Tp . From
this, the probability Palive that a detector is not dark can
be found to be Palive = P
−1
hit /(P
−1
hit +n), where we assume
that a detector remains dark for a time τd, no matter how
many photons arrive while it is dark. The average num-
ber of raw bits Nraw exchanged during a dead time τd is
therefore
Nraw =
τd
Tp
(N − 1)P 2s P 2alive
N
. (3)
Maximizing Nraw with respect to Tp, we find the maxi-
mum of Nraw (assuming Ps  N):
N
(M)
raw
τd
= max
Tp
{
Nraw(Tp, Ps, N)
τd
}
=
Ps(N − 1)
4τd
. (4)
(Time) In the time encoding, two detectors are used [see
Fig. 1(b)], and the minimum time separation between
two consecutive qudits is NTp. Following the same pro-
cedure outlined above, we find Nraw, that is the same as
in Eq. (3), but divided by a factor 2. This follows from
the fact that during a train of N pulses, the same detec-
tor cannot click twice, leading to a better performance of
the space protocol for short distances (see Fig. 3). The
maximum number of bits exchanged during the detector’s
dead time τd is thus (Ps  N):
N
(M)
raw
τd
=
Ps(N − 1)
8τdN
. (5)
5Including the results found for the saturation regime,
and limiting the interval Tp between consecutive pulses
to some minimal value T˜p, the raw key rate R can finally
be determined to be:
R =
N
(M)
raw
τd
Rp (6)
where the raw key rate per application of the protocol
Rp assumes no detector dead time τd = 0. Here, N
(M)
raw is
either Eq. (4) (space encoding) or Eq. (5) (time encod-
ing) when the optimal Tp is bigger than T˜p. Otherwise,
N
(M)
raw is given by Eq. (3) with the substitution Tp → T˜p.
Since the number of pulses is varied to reach the opti-
mal performance, we evaluate the raw key rate in units
of the detector dead time τd. Therefore, while Rp is in
bit/pulse, R is in unit of bit/s.
Since detectors are usually the limiting resource, we
renormalize the raw key rate R in Eq. (6) with respect
to the number of detectors ndet employed. This renor-
malization takes into account that 2N detectors could be
used to perform N parallel applications of a two dimen-
sional protocol, possibly outperforming the Hi–D setup.
The rates per resource are shown in Fig. 3, with the
plain dots referring to T˜p = τd/100, the empty ones
to T˜p = τd/20. Figure 3 shows that with a limited
rate of pulse generation (and thus finite T˜p), there ex-
ists an optimal dimension Nopt for the best key rate:
Nopt = 2 + Psτd/T˜p (for Ps  N). For Psτd/Tp & 1, we
see that with Hi–D mdi–QKD we increase the key rate
per detector, due to the factor 2(N − 1)/N found above.
Our work allows, for given experimental conditions, to
evaluate a priori which is the best setting to be employed
in order to achieve the highest secret key rate. As an ex-
ample, Fig. 2(c) shows the secret key rate r as a function
of distance. For these curves, we used Eqs. (6) and (2)
to determine the raw (R) and the secret (r) key rates,
respectively. With the chosen parameters, for short dis-
tances it is better to use Hi–D mdi–QKD in the space
encoding, while for very long distances low dimensional
time encoding is preferable. Three regimes are visible in
the plot: in the central region the rate scales as P 2s , as
two clicks are required. In the detector saturation regime,
the probability for the detectors not to be dark is P−1s ,
meaning that the rate is linear in Ps. Finally, for large
distances dark counts prevail, making QKD impossible.
Note that for an accurate cost analysis, the number of
detectors employed must also be considered, as in Fig. 3.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have generalized the standard mdi–
QKD protocol to higher dimensions N . In our analysis
we consider the main sources of errors, and we prove the
advantages of Hi–D mdi–QKD, particularly in the de-
tector saturation regime. This result improves previous
mdi–QKD schemes, allowing for higher communication
FIG. 3. Raw key per detector Rdet = R/ndet as a function of
the dimension N , in the detector saturation regime. Violet
circles (full and empty) are used for the space encoding. Blue
squares (full and empty) for the time encoding. The num-
ber of pulses n within τd is optimized to achieve the highest
rate. The maximum possible number of qubits τd/T˜p is either
equal to 20 (empty circles and squares) or 100 (full circles
and squares). Ps = 0.2, τd = 20 ns, and ndet = 2N (space)
or ndet = 2 (time).
rates. The considered generalization to Hi–D mdi–QKD
is only one out of many possibilities. An attractive fea-
ture of our proposal, is that it can directly be imple-
mented with existing technology. The protocol works
by projecting the state onto a two dimensional Hilbert
space, through the Bell state measurement performed by
Charlie. Genuine Hi–D Bell state analysers would allow
higher key rates, by increasing the PIE and reducing the
informations acquired by Eve. However, discriminating
Bell states with linear optics is challenging, leaving the
Hi–D ones inaccessible [25]. The proposals in Refs. [39–
41] for Hi–D Bell state analysis, may allow for genuine
exploitation of high dimensional Bell states, but remain
experimentally challenging. The present approach is thus
the most attractive from a practical perspective.
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